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Do Accurate Earnings Forecasts Facilitate Superior Investment Recommendations? 
ABSTRACT 
We carefully construct measures of earnings forecast accuracy and recommendation 
profitability that enable us to examine the association between the qualities of these two key 
outputs of individual security analysts. We find that analysts with superior earnings forecasts 
issue significantly more profitable recommendations than those with less accurate forecasts. The 
average annual recommendations return of top one-third analysts sorted on forecast accuracy 
exceeds that of the bottom third by 10.8% during our sample period. Our results suggest that 
imperfectly efficient markets allow information gatherers like security analysts to be rewarded 
for their costly activities. Our findings also provide direct empirical support for the recent 
“valuation” models in accounting and finance literature (Ohlson (1995) and others) that 
emphasize the role of future earnings in predicting stock price movements. 
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I. Introduction 
Security analysts play an important role as financial intermediaries in modern day financial 
markets. Not surprisingly then, their two key outputs - earnings forecasts and stock 
recommendations have been the subjects of a burgeoning literature in finance and accounting. 
The extant studies, however, either focus on earnings forecasts or stock recommendations in 
isolation. There is hardly any study that examines these two analyst outputs in tandem1.  
This is surprising given that such an analysis could prove useful for at least four reasons. 
First, from a resource allocation perspective, the large amount of resources that analysts devote 
to forecasting earnings does suggest that an accurate earnings forecast is not merely an end to 
itself, but a tool for them to gauge the investment potential of a company’s stock. As observed by 
Schipper (1991), earnings forecasts are “not a final product but rather an input into generating a 
final product” (p. 113). It is, therefore, important to know whether or not the resources spent on 
producing precise appraisals of earnings do provide analysts with a competitive edge in 
appraising the investment potential of companies. 
Second, the abnormal earnings valuation model (see, for example, Ohlson (1995)) 
envisages a central role of future corporate earnings in determining the intrinsic value of a stock. 
The advent of this model in the 1990s has drawn renewed attention of researchers, especially in 
the accounting literature, to the predictive role of earnings. Indeed, one strand of the ensuing 
“valuation” or “fundamental analysis research” takes up the question: would it be possible for an 
investor to employ superior estimates of future earnings (along with an earnings-based stock 
valuation model) to generate superior stock returns.  Most of these studies conclude that 
earnings, more than the cash flows or the dividends, could be combined with a stock valuation 
model to earn abnormal stock returns (Frankel and Lee (1998), Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan 
(1999), Lee, Myers and Swaminathan (1999); also see the survey in Lee (1999)). While these 
studies take a somewhat “normative” approach and evoke the possibility that investors could 
convert their earnings forecasts into more profitable investment strategies, they do not provide 
direct empirical evidence that real-world investors are in fact able to do so. Our study aims to 
examine this issue using the specific setting of sell-side security analysts. Analysts issue both 
earnings forecasts and stock recommendation for firms in their respective industries, and hence, 
provide a unique setting in which the opinions about investment potential and future earnings of 
an economic agent can be observed simultaneously. This enables us to focus on the question: do 
investors with superior earnings forecasts indeed earn superior returns. An affirmative answer to 
this question would provide direct empirical support for fundamental analysis or valuation 
research. 
Third, investigating the association between the quality of recommendation and the quality 
of earnings forecasts could also provide additional evidence on the existence and the sources of 
analysts’ ability to issue profitable stock recommendations. Prior evidence on the profitability of 
analysts’ investment advice has been mixed (Womack (1996) and Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, 
                                                 
1 A notable exception is the paper by Bradshaw (2002) that tests the hypothesis that analysts utilize the abnormal 
earnings valuation model of Ohlson (1995) in transforming their earnings forecasts into stock recommendations.  
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and Trueman. (2001)). Besides, more recently, reports in the popular media and certain academic 
studies (Jegadeesh et al. (2001), and Cornell (2001)) suggest that analysts’ recommendations are 
based on ad hoc heuristics, instead of being the result of sound economic analyses. Relating 
investment advice to the quality of the underlying earnings forecasts could shed light on whether 
or not any observed profitability of recommendations is real or not. If the analysts with the most 
profitable recommendations also exhibit superior forecasting skills, it would suggest that their 
stock picking ability is real, and that it is founded on economic rationale.  
Fourth, it is well known that analysts are evaluated on four criteria: stock-picking ability, 
earnings forecast accuracy, written reports quality and overall service (Stickel (1992)). Annual 
polls by practitioner journals such as Institutional Investor and the Wall Street Journal describe 
these as the determining qualities of top-ranked analysts. It is commonly perceived that superior 
analysts score high on all four of these criteria, implying a correlation between them. This is also 
implicitly assumed by studies such as O’Brien (1990) and Stickel (1992) who identify superior 
analysts by focusing on only one of the four criteria. This notion, though intuitively appealing, 
has never been tested empirically. We note, as other researchers do, that the latter two criteria are 
of a subjective nature and are difficult to examine empirically (see, for example, O’Brien 
(1990)). However, objective evaluations can be applied to empirical data on the first two criteria, 
thus providing an opportunity to put this assumed correlation to the test. The existence or 
absence of such correlation has particular practical significance for buy side fund managers who 
rely on the services of analysts, and seek the best sources of advice for both investment calls and 
earnings forecasts.  
In this paper, we first construct a measure of an analyst’s earnings forecasting ability 
relative to other analysts in the same industry-year. This measure carefully controls for the firm, 
industry and time horizon effects. Using this industry-year perspective, we also construct 
corresponding measure of recommendation profitability of an analyst. We then examine whether 
an analyst’s recommendation profitability is related to his earnings forecast accuracy. Our results 
suggest that better earnings forecasts, perhaps an indication of better assessment of future 
prospects of a company, indeed enables analysts to issue more profitable stock 
recommendations. Analysts with superior earnings forecasts earn annual returns significantly 
superior to those with inferior forecasts.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we construct our 
measures of forecasting skill and investment profitability of an individual analyst. In Section III, 
we describe the data and present summary statistics. Section IV presents our findings. Finally, 
we discuss the implications of our findings and conclude the paper in Section V.  
 
II. Measures of Forecast Accuracy and Recommendation Profitability 
We use an industry-year perspective to evaluate an analyst for his stock recommendation 
and earnings forecasting skills. It is well known that analysts are evaluated at the industry level, 
evident from market surveys such as Institutional Investor’s annual ranking of analysts within 
industries (O’Brien (1990). This is understandable considering the existence of industry-specific 
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characteristics which render across industry comparisons somewhat meaningless. Hence, the 
measures of recommendation profitability and forecast accuracy we develop and employ in our 
analysis evaluate and compare analysts within the same industry – signified by the 2-digit SIC 
code. The yearly yardstick we use to measure an analyst’s ability is also consistent with the 
market’s appraisal of analysts. For example, Stickel (1992) and Michaely and Womack (1999) 
report that an analyst’s ranking in the yearly opinion polls exerts a critical influence on his 
compensation.  
To avoid the messy problem of non-overlapping horizons, we exclude from our sample 
firms whose financial years do not end in December. Following Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki 
(2001), we specify the fiscal year (FY) as the period between the successive annual earnings 
announcement dates rather than between calendar year-ends. So, for example, if a company 
announces its earnings in February every year, then the fiscal year t would cover a period of 
February t to February t+1. Though the announcement dates of firms may differ, the bulk of 
December year-end companies report their earnings by February. Hence the fiscal year horizon 
we consider should still be very similar across firms.  
For the rest of the paper, we use the term calendar year to denote the financial year ending 
December 31st so as to avoid confusion with our usage of the term fiscal year. Our eventual 
sample period of FY1994-1999, thus, corresponds to a calendar period of approximately 
February 1994 to February 2000. In all empirical specifications following this section, we use the 
sub-notations i, j, k, t to denote an individual analyst, firm, industry, and fiscal year, respectively. 
In the following pages, we proceed to construct variables that proxy an analyst’s earnings 
forecasting skill and stock picking ability. 
A. Measure of Earnings Forecast Accuracy  
To measure an analyst’s forecast accuracy for a firm, we adopt Clement’s (1999) 
performance measure which compares an analyst’s absolute forecast error to the average 
absolute forecast error of other analysts following the same firm. Formally, analyst i’s forecast 
accuracy is defined by his proportional mean absolute forecast error (PMAFE), given by,  
 
jt
jtijt
ijt AFE
AFEAFE
PMAFE
−=  (1) 
where ijtAFE  represents analyst i’s absolute forecast error for firm j in fiscal year t, and 
jtAFE  is the mean absolute forecast error of all analysts issuing FY1 forecasts on firm j in fiscal 
year t. Subtracting the mean absolute forecast error from the analyst’s absolute forecast error 
controls for firm-year effects. Firm-year effects result from firm or year-specific factors that 
make certain firms’ earnings tougher or easier to forecast in certain years. For instance, some 
firms may engage more actively in earnings management (Abarbanell and Lehavy (2000)), or 
some years may contain macro-economic shocks which influence absolute forecast errors 
upwards (O’Brien (1990)). Scaling the numerator by jtAFE  controls for the heteroscedasticity 
of forecast error distributions across firms (Clement (1999)).  
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The measure ijtPMAFE can be interpreted as analyst i’s fractional forecast error relative to 
the average of analysts’ absolute forecast errors for firm j in fiscal year t. Negative values of 
ijtPMAFE  represent above average performance whilst positive values represent below average 
performance. Zero, by definition, signifies an average performing analyst. To obtain meaningful 
values of this relative measure of accuracy, we include only those firms in our analysis that have 
at least four analysts issuing forecasts of its earnings. 
Not all analysts issuing forecasts for firm j are included in our analysis. We restrict our 
sample of analysts to those who issue forecasts for firm j within the first 30 calendar days of the 
fiscal year2, choosing their latest forecast within this window. This is because analysts who 
initiate coverage later in the fiscal year might be copying the forecasts of other analysts rather 
than actually covering the firm itself (see, for example, Cooper, Day, and Lewis (2001)). We 
select this 30-day window for two reasons. First, this is the window period whereby year t–1’s 
earnings are recently announced and forecasting activity is at its highest. Second, and more 
importantly, the short length of the window controls for the forecast recency effect. Past research 
has shown that when all forecasts are not equally recent, analysts who make forecasts later have 
an information advantage (see, for example, O’Brien (1990), and Sinha, Brown, and Das 
(1997)). Our method of using a window to control for recency is analogous to that employed by 
Sinha et al. (1997). 
Recall that the objective is to measure an analyst’s forecast accuracy for the entire fiscal 
period, not just for one single horizon. One should not, therefore, base ijtAFE  on one single 
horizon. In doing so, potentially, one may either penalize an analyst for one bad forecast, or 
glorify him for a single fluke estimate. We suggest, therefore, an aggregate measure that takes 
into account four salient forecast horizons for the measurement of the yearly (FY1) forecast 
accuracy. These four horizons are the one-year ahead, three-quarters ahead, two-quarters ahead, 
and the final unrevised forecast of FY1 earnings (see Figure 1). The absolute forecast error of 
analyst i forecasting for firm j in fiscal year t, ijtAFE  will thus be given by: 
 ∑= −−=
4
14
1
x
xq
ijtjtijt FEAFE  (2) 
where jtE  is the actual earnings for firm j in fiscal year t, and 
xq
ijtF
−  is analyst i’s forecast 
of year t’s FY1 earnings at the x-quarter ahead horizon. From the visual illustration in Figure 1, 
we observe that the first horizon is the one-year ahead (or four-quarter ahead) forecast, 4−qijtF . 
Next is the three-quarter ahead forecast ( 3−qijtF ), followed by the two-quarter ahead forecast 
( 2−qijtF ), and finally, the one-quarter ahead forecast (
1−q
ijtF ). For each of the first three horizons, 
we pick the latest forecast outstanding based on a 30-day window following the last earnings 
announcement date. If the analyst did not issue a new forecast in this window, we take his most 
                                                 
2 That is, within the 30-day window after the announcement of the previous year’s annual earnings. In a later 
section, we also employ a 60-day window to test the robustness of our results. 
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recent forecast prior to this window period. This assumes that he had the opportunity, but chose 
not to revise his expectations of year t’s earnings.  
For the final one-quarter ahead forecast horizon, we select the final unrevised forecast 
prior to year t’s earnings announcement date. The final unrevised is chosen as the last horizon 
because it is the last forecast made by the analyst for the given fiscal year. It is also one forecast 
that is most likely to be subject to a market test - since the analyst sees no more need to revise 
that forecast. Data to calculate all four horizons must be available for an analyst to be included in 
the sample. This criterion ensures that the selected analysts were following the firm for the entire 
fiscal year. 
For each analyst i, we aggregate the forecast performance measure ijtPMAFE  (earlier 
given in equation 1) for all the firms that he covers in industry k. This is represented by: 
 ∑==
fn
j
ijt
f
ikt PMAFEn
PMAFE
1
1
 (3) 
 
where iktPMAFE  is simply the average of ijtPMAFE  across all the fn  firms covered by 
analyst i in industry k in fiscal year t. To ensure that there can be meaningful comparison of 
relative performance within the industry, we include only industries where there are at least five 
eligible analysts issuing forecasts. Also, we remove industries which have less than five eligible 
firms after all previous screening criteria – so as to focus on reasonably sized industries.  
Finally, as Hong and Kubik (2003) argue, the yearly performance measures such as the 
one in equation (3) could be a noisy proxy for the underlying forecasting skill of an analyst. 
Therefore, the final step in our assessment of the forecasting skill of an analyst is to aggregate 
this yearly measure for analyst i across all six years in our sample to obtain the aggregate 
measure of forecasting skill.  
 
∑
=
=
1999
1994
1
t
ijtik PMAFET
PMAFE
 (4) 
Where T represents the total number of years an analyst appears in our sample of 1994-99.  
B. Measure of Recommendation Profitability 
Having formulated the measure for earnings forecast accuracy, we proceed to derive a 
proxy for an analyst’s stock picking ability. In doing so, we cover all the recommendations an 
analyst issues, inclusive of reiterations. 
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B.1. Compounded Stock Return in the Recommendation Period 
To determine the actual profitability of the recommendation, we look at the holding period 
stock return for the duration of the recommendation. This is the daily return, inclusive of 
dividends, of a firm’s stock, compounded across the entire duration for which the 
recommendation remains outstanding. More specifically, the duration of the recommendation is 
defined as the recommendation date to the earlier of the next recommendation date or the end of 
the fiscal year. Therefore the compounded return of firm j for the duration of analyst i’s 
recommendation h in fiscal year t is given by:  
 1)1(
1
−+=∏
=
d
jihjt RETreturnsRaw
τ
τ  (5) 
where τjRET  is the daily return of firm j’s stock on dayτ , and d is the duration of the 
recommendation in trading days.  Note that the left hand side in equation (5) is the raw stock 
return of firm j for the duration of recommendation h. In order to evaluate the stock picking 
ability of an analyst, one must adjust these` raw returns with the returns on the overall market 
index, or better still, returns from a portfolio of stocks with similar risk characteristics. We obtain 
this adjustment by computing the size-adjusted (and alternatively, market-adjusted) stock return, 
ihjtr , as follows: 
 

 −+−= ∏
=
1)1(
1
d
jihjtihjt MKTRETreturnsRawr
τ
τ  (6) 
where τjMKTRET  is the daily return on the corresponding CRSP decile (or alternatively, 
CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq value-weighted market index) to which the stock belongs at the 
start of the calendar year, on day τ . d is the duration in trading days for which recommendation 
h remains effective.  
In computing ihjtr , we track the recommendation based on the exact date specified in 
I/B/E/S’s “Recommendation Date” field. Technically, this is the date that the recommendation 
was entered into the I/B/E/S system. This is the same day that the recommendation was issued to 
the market since the submission process is an electronic one and is almost instantaneous. 
However, the fact that clients could receive the recommendation before it was issued to the 
market should still warrant the use of an earlier date to start tracking returns. We follow Francis 
and Soffer (1997) in defining the start date of a recommendation as the day –1 instead of day 0. 
In a later section, we also repeat all our analyses using day 0 as the start dates of the 
recommendations as a robustness check. We find that the choice of the start date (day 0 or –1) is 
immaterial in affecting our conclusions. Thus, all subsequent tabulated results are based on day  
–1 as the first date of recommendation.  
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B.2. Treatment of the Five Recommendation Categories 
The compounded stock return derived above is then converted to actual recommendation 
returns based on the type of recommendation issued. While brokers may have different 
investment ratings scales, I/B/E/S establishes its own five-point rating system as follows: 1 = 
Strong Buy, 2 = Buy, 3 = Hold, 4 = Underperform, and 5 = Sell. When a contributing broker 
sends in a recommendation, it is mapped onto one of I/B/E/S’s standard ratings and entered into 
the database. 
Prior literature finds that the distribution of recommendations across the five categories is 
skewed – there are far more favorable recommendations than the unfavorable ones (see, for 
example, Jegadeesh et al. (2001), and Barber et al. (2001)). In our sample, the 1,858 analysts 
issue a total of 56,113 recommendations. Consistent with prior studies, the percentage of strong 
buy and buy recommendations in our sample are about 26% and 35%, respectively. Another 35% 
are hold. The unfavorable recommendations (underperform and sell) make up only 4 % of all the 
recommendations.  
In our analysis, we need to differentiate analysts in their stock picking skills. To calculate 
the returns for each individual recommendation, therefore, we treat the five recommendation 
categories as follows. We calculate the return for buy recommendation by simply equating raw 
recommendation returns, ihjtR to ihjtr . However, for strong buys, we calculate returns, ihjtR , as 
twice that of 2 ihjtr . This assumes that investors make twice the investment in stocks that are 
strong buys than those that are buys.  
The case for hold recommendations is unique. The well known dearth of sell 
recommendations, also evident in our sample, makes researchers wonder if some sells are 
actually hidden behind the euphemism of holds (Barber et al. (2001), and Hirst et al. (1995))3.  
We follow the previous studies and treat holds as sell, and set ihjtihjt rR −= . This implies investors 
short-sell the securities that are rated hold by analysts. Finally, for underperform and sell 
recommendations, we set ihjtihjt rR 2−= , assuming that one shorts the stock by double the amount 
than for stocks with simply a hold recommendation. 
B.3. Firm Recommendation Profitability 
An analyst could make more than one recommendation for the same firm in the same 
fiscal year. One way to handle multiple recommendations for one firm is to take the arithmetic 
mean return of all of an analyst’s recommendations for the firm in a year. However, this is not 
representative of the actual returns generated by following the analyst’s recommendations for the 
firm for the entire fiscal year. Conceptually, one finds that the method of geometrically 
                                                 
3 Barber at al. (2001) in their paper form five portfolio consisting of firms whose consensus recommendations 
vary from most favorable to least favorable. Holds (consensus recommendation code=3) actually featured in the 
second most unfavorable portfolio, which they eventually sell short when computing return differences.  
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compounding the recommendation returns more appropriate. Hence, we calculate analyst i’s 
recommendation profitability for firm j in fiscal year t, ijtPROF  as: 
 ( ) 11
1
−

 += ∏
=
H
h
ihjtijt RPROF    (7) 
Subject to the condition: 1−≥ihjtR  (8) 
In equation 7, H is the total number of recommendations that analyst i issues for firm j in 
fiscal year t. The condition given by equation 8 is necessary in order to address a mathematical 
predicament. Since we allow for shorting of a security, it is possible (though highly unlikely) that 
a sell recommendation yields a return 1−≤ihjtR . This literally means that firm’s stock, after 
being recommended as a sell by analyst i, appreciates by more than 100% in the duration of the 
recommendation.  Mathematically, one observes that a negative )1( ihjtR+  renders equation 7 
meaningless. Therefore, one has to correct this hitch by winsorizing all ihjtR  1−≤  to be 1−= 4.  
B.4. Industry Recommendation Profitability  
From an analyst’s firm level recommendation profitability, we obtain his industry level 
profitability. This we define as the average recommendation profitability of all the firms he 
covers in the industry.  
 ∑= ×=
rn
j
ijtijtikt PROFCAPWTPROF
1
 (9) 
iktPROF  is analyst i’s recommendation returns for all the rn  firms that he follows in 
industry k. iktPROF  can be understood as the average recommendation returns (in percent) 
generated when one mimics the recommendations of an analyst by investing or shorting stocks 
that the analyst recommends for the duration of a fiscal year. ijtCAPWT is the market 
capitalization of the recommended firm divided by the total market capitalization of all the firms 
recommended by analyst i in year t. Market capitalization data is recorded at the beginning of the 
calendar year5. 
As a final step, similar to our forecast accuracy measure, we aggregate the yearly 
recommendation profitability over the six years sample period to obtain the average measure of 
                                                 
4 Not surprisingly, the number of recommendations that we have to winsorize represents less than 0.01% of all 
recommendations.  
5 We also use an equal-weighted approach in forming an aggregate measure of an analyst’s industry 
recommendation profitability. The results, not reported in the paper, are similar.  
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profitability for an analyst, ikPROF
6. This aggregated measure is likely to be less noisy and more 
reflective of the true stock picking ability of an analyst.  
 
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We utilize I/B/E/S’s (Institutional Brokers Estimates Systems) analyst-by-analyst Detail 
History File for earnings estimates. Each observation in this file represents an individual forecast 
with the relevant company ticker, broker code, analyst code, forecast period indicator, and 
estimate date. To ascertain forecast accuracy, we also make use of the I/B/E/S Actuals file. This 
records the actual reported earnings along with the corresponding company ticker, periodicity 
indicator, period end date, and report date. Following Lim (2001), we remove observations with 
forecast errors exceeding 10 dollars as these most probably resulted from a data input error.  
We obtain stock recommendations of analysts from the I/B/E/S’s Detail Recommendations 
file. Each observation in this file contains a recommendation code, company ticker, broker code, 
analyst code, and recommendation date. Compared with its earnings estimates data, I/B/E/S’s 
recommendations data is of a shorter length, beginning only in October 1993 (earnings forecasts 
history starts in 1976). Consequently, the period of our eventual sample is FY1994-1999. 
In order to examine an analyst’s stock picking ability, we obtain stock returns from the 
CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices) database at the University of Chicago. 
Specifically, the daily stock returns file is used in order to measure the profitability of 
recommendations over their precise durations. For each firm, we extract daily returns for the 
period that it is represented in our recommendation sample. For each calendar year end, we 
extract the firm’s exchange code, Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 2-digit Code, and 
market capitalization. Finally, to enable computations of adjusted returns, we obtain the daily 
returns on the CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq value-weighted market index for the entire sample 
period.7  We also obtain the size-sorted decile returns. We match the capitalization of a stock at 
                                                 
6 There is one notable difference in the measures we develop for forecasting and stock picking skills. The 
forecasting measure is calculated after adjusting for firm and year effects; whereas stock picking ability is only 
adjusted for the industry and year effects. For earnings forecasts, it has been well established that forecast errors are 
not comparable across different firms (see, for example, Clement (1999), O’Brien (1990), and Sinha et al. (1997)). 
Therefore, in order to correctly rate an analyst’s forecasting skill, one needs to pit him against analysts who are 
forecasting for the same firm. If he were the sole analyst forecasting for the firm, his forecast error would hardly be 
informative for one to gauge his forecasting ability (Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000)). Hence an eligibility screen 
of at least four analysts issuing forecasts for a firm needs to be imposed so that there is a basis for relative 
forecasting performance. 
However, one does not face such a constraint when measuring stock picking ability. An analyst’s stock picking 
ability is simply the profitability of his recommendations (after adjusting for risk). If he so wishes to pick stocks 
neglected by his compatriots, one can well allow him to do so. The measure of performance – recommendation 
returns – will be comparable across firms within the same industry.  
7 About two-third of the firms in our sample are listed in NYSE, with most of the remaining ones listed on 
Nasdaq. We also select the value-weighted index over the equal-weighted one since it is a better benchmark by 
which to adjust for the returns on mainly large firms followed by I/B/E/S. However, the eventual results are 
insensitive to the choice between these two benchmarks.  
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the start of a calendar year to identify the decile to which a stock belong to, and then use the 
returns on this decile over the following year to obtain the size-adjusted returns for a particular 
stock.  
The descriptive statistics for our sample are presented in Table I. The sample consists of 
2,322 industry-analyst observations for which we are able to compute forecast accuracy, 
iktPMAFE , and recommendation profitability, iktPROF  for at least one of the years during 1994-
99. Most analysts would appear in multiple years. In such cases, as mentioned above, we take the 
average of their yearly performance measures to obtain an overall assessment of their skills. Our 
sample contains 1,858 unique analysts forecasting for 30 different industries. We define 
industries using the 2-digit SIC codes. On average, an analyst in our sample covers 1.2 
industries. The majority of analysts in our sample, thus, cover only one industry. The most (least) 
widely followed industry is covered by 288 (8) analysts. The average coverage is 77 analysts for 
an industry.  
 
IV. Results  
A. Persistence in Forecasting and Stock Picking Abilities 
If superior forecast accuracy and stock picking were the result of superior underlying skills 
of analysts (that is, these were not random), and the measures we develop were good proxies for 
these skills, one should observe some persistence over time in our computations of an analyst’s 
forecasting and stock picking performance. Therefore, we begin our empirical analysis by first 
examining the persistence over time in our measures.  
More specifically, an analyst’s forecasting (stock picking) performance in year t should be 
positively related to that analyst’s performance in year t-1. In order to investigate this for the 
measure of forecasting ability, we estimate the following regression. 
iktiktiktiktikt DSIZEDEXPPMAFEPMAFE εαααα ++++= − 32110  (10) 
Here α1 represents the relation between the forecasting accuracy of an analyst over the 
successive years. iktDEXP  and iktDSIZE  are control variables for analyst experience and broker 
size, respectively. Extant literature shows that these two analyst characteristics positively impact 
an analyst’s forecast accuracy (Mikhail et al. (1997) and Clement (1999)). Analyst experience is 
proxied by tracking the number of years that the analyst appears in the I/B/E/S earnings forecasts 
database (similar to the treatment in Hong et al. (2000)), whilst broker size is estimated by 
counting the number of analysts that a broker employs at the beginning of a calendar year. 
Similar to earlier studies (Hong et al. 2000), these two variables are included as dummy variables 
- they take a value of “1” when the analyst belongs to the top quartile of either experience or 
broker size, and zero otherwise. 
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We report the estimates of this regression in Panel A of Table II. The estimate of α1 is 
positive with a t-statistic of 3.67. This indicates persistence in our yearly measure of forecasting 
skills. The coefficient for the size dummy is negative. This is consistent with prior literature, and 
suggests that analysts working for large brokerage houses issue more accurate forecasts.  
For the measure of recommendation profitability, we estimate the following model. 
iktiktiktikt dummiesYeardummiesIndustryDSIZEPROFPROF εααα +++++= − 2110   
  (11) 
Again our focus is on α1 in this equation that captures the relation between the 
recommendation profitability of an analyst over successive years. Extant literature suggests that 
the size of the brokerage houses might positively impact an analyst’s recommendation 
profitability (Barber et al. (2000)). To control for this, we include iktDSIZE  in equation (11). We 
also add the industry and year dummies to control for the fact that some industries in certain 
years outperform or underperform the market averages. 
The estimates of this model are reported in Panel B of Table II. The reported value of α1 is 
0.075 with a t-statistic of 2.27, indicating persistence in our measure of recommendation 
profitability. The persistence in both our measures for forecasting and recommendation 
profitability is reassuring for our subsequent analysis, as it suggests that our measures indeed 
capture the underlying forecasting and stock picking skills of analysts. 
 
B. Stock Picking Abilities of the Best and the Worst Forecasters 
If precise earnings forecasts assist in making superior investment decisions, then analysts 
with more accurate earnings forecasts should have more profitable stock recommendations. In 
Table III, we sort the analysts according to their forecast accuracy over the sample period, and 
divide them into three groups. The first group represents the analysts with the most accurate 
forecasts, whereas the last group represents the analysts with the least accurate forecasts. We, 
then, calculate the equally-weighted average of the size-adjusted recommendation profitability of 
analysts, ikPROF , for each group. The last column in Table III represents the difference between 
the profitability of the most accurate and the least accurate forecasters. If the best forecasters 
issue the most accurate recommendations, the difference would be positive.  
The last row in Table III reports the results for our overall sample, whereas the first five 
rows report the results for the five largest industries each of which is represented by at least 150 
analysts. As the positive values in the last column indicate, the results for the overall sample as 
well as for each of the top five industries indicate a positive association between forecasting and 
stock picking skills.  
For the overall sample, the analysts with the best forecasting skills have average size-
adjusted returns of 7.72% for their recommendations. The analysts with the worst forecasts, on 
the other hand, have size-adjusted returns of -3.04%. The difference in the average 
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recommendation returns of the best and the worst forecasters is 10.76%. This difference is also 
statistically significant with a t-statistic of 2.69. In addition, for each of the five industries, the 
analysts with the most accurate forecasts outperform the analysts with the least accurate 
forecasts. Overall, these results suggest that more accurate forecast facilitate superior investment 
recommendations. 
The negative average returns for the two groups of analysts with less accurate forecasts 
also indicate that most analysts underperforms relative to the returns on the similar size decile 
portfolio8. Another noticeable feature of the industry wide analysis in Table III is the strong 
industry factor in recommendation returns. Not surprisingly, some industries significantly 
outperform others during our sample period.  
 
C.  Regressing Recommendation Profitability on Forecasting Skill 
To supplement our analysis in the preceding section, we regress the profitability of an 
analyst’s recommendation profitability on his forecast accuracy while controlling for other 
factors that could affect recommendation profitability. Our model is as follows: 
ikikikik IndustryDSIZEPMAFEPROF εααα ++++= dummies 210  (12) 
The coefficient 1α  signifies the extent to which ikPROF  (size-adjusted recommendation 
profitability of analyst i for industry k) can be explained by his relative forecast accuracy, 
ikPMAFE . If the stock picking ability of an analyst were positively associated with earnings 
forecasting skill, 1α  would be negative.9 As mentioned earlier, we use dummy variables in the 
above model to control for differences in industry returns. Furthermore, as explained above, 
iktDSIZE  takes a value of 1 if analyst i works for the largest quartile of the brokerage houses, and 
zero otherwise. We add this variable to control for the brokerage house effect in recommendation 
profitability as documented by Barber, Lehavy and Trueman (2000). 
To test the robustness of our results, we estimate the above model for the total sample 
period as well as for the two sub-periods spanning three years each; first sub-period is 1994-96 
and the second sub-period is 1997-99. For the total sample estimation, we aggregate ikPROF  and 
ikPMAFE  measures for each analyst over the six-year sample period. However, for the two sub-
periods, we aggregate the two performance measures over the respective three-year periods.  
We report the results of these estimations in Table IV. The coefficient of ikPMAFE  is -
0.158 and is reliably different from zero with a t-statistic of 2.88. This indicates that an analyst’s 
                                                 
8 Our results in Table III remain unchanged if we adjust the returns using market returns instead of size-based 
decile returns. 
9 Note that a negative relationship between recommendation profitability and forecast error implies a positive 
association between recommendation profitability and forecasting ability (since smaller forecast errors correspond to 
higher forecast accuracy).  
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recommendation profitability is positively associated with the accuracy of his earnings forecasts. 
The relation is also negative and statistically significant for the two sub-periods.  
D. Robustness of Results 
In this section, we investigate the sensitivity of our results to changes in some of the 
parameters we used to calculate the forecast accuracy and the profitability measures. First, we 
examine the effect of using a 60-day window to calculate forecast recency. Recall that in our 
earlier calculations of yearly forecast accuracy, we employ a 30-day window to judge if an 
analyst actively follows a firm, and therefore, should be included in the pool of analysts to 
calculate relative forecast accuracy. Our results remain robust to the use of this alternative 
window.  
Second, we adjust the recommendation returns of analysts with the value-weighted market 
returns instead of using the similar size decile returns. The estimates of the regression using this 
alternative definition of abnormal returns are reported in Panel A of Table V. The 
recommendation profitability of analysts remains positively related to their forecasting skills. 
Third, we also estimate our model by starting the computation of the recommendation 
profitability on day 0, that is, on the day on which the recommendation appears in the IBES 
database, instead of using day -1 as in our previous analysis. The results are reported in Panel B 
of Table V, and are similar to our earlier results.  
Finally, we also test the robustness of our results by computing the profitability of an 
analyst’s multiple recommendations by equally-weighting the profitability of the 
recommendations for individual firms instead of weighting by market capitalization. The results, 
not reported here, remain similar10.  
In concluding this section, we would like to point out a caveat. The empirical framework 
in this paper is exploratory, and not predictive. That is, while we investigate the 
contemporaneous association between forecast accuracy and profitability for the cross-section of 
analysts, we do not attempt to present a model that predicts the future recommendation 
profitability of an analyst based on the past accuracy of his forecasts.  
 
V. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the relation between the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts 
and the profitability of their stock recommendations. A useful feature of our empirical 
framework is that, unlike a few prior studies that attempt to link analysts forecast with their stock 
                                                 
10 In fact, alternative ways of measuring abnormal recommendation returns (for example, adjusting with market 
returns or similar-size decile returns, or equal- versus capitalization-weighting of multiple recommendations of an 
analyst) result in profitability measures for analysts that are highly correlated with bivariate correlations exceeding 
0.97.  
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recommendations11, we do not require any assumption as to how analysts translate their EPS 
forecasts into stock recommendations. Our results indicate that analysts with superior earnings 
forecasts not only outperform their counterparts with less accurate forecasts, but also outperform 
the market and the similar size decile returns. Superior earnings forecasts of analysts do indeed 
appear to facilitate superior investment recommendations. The positive correlation in forecasting 
and stock picking abilities we document in this paper has relevance not only for fund managers 
who seek best advice from analysts for both future earnings and recommendations, but is also re-
assuring for academic studies that presume such a correlation.  
Several previous studies examine the profitability of investment decisions of the 
professionals including fund managers and security analysts. While the results from these studies 
have so far been mixed, our paper attempts to relate any observed differences in individual 
analysts’ recommendations profitability to their assessments of future corporate earnings. The 
existence or absence of a relation between the two allows one to make conjectures as to whether 
any observed profitability is random or is founded on sound economic analyses. We document a 
positive relationship between recommendation profitability and earnings forecast accuracy. Our 
results are, thus, consistent with a sub-set of analysts being able to exhibit superior stock picking 
skills that are real and not merely the result of chance, as these analysts have corroborating 
earnings forecasting skills.  
This interpretation, in a way, also provides some credence to the analyst profession at a 
time when they are taking a lot of flak for their over-enthusiastic promotion of stocks in the 
period leading up to the burst of the tech-bubble. This wave of criticism, though targeted mainly 
at technology analysts, has repercussions on the way the entire analyst community is now 
perceived. Certainly there exist black sheep in the profession, but our results suggest that a better 
assessment of future corporate earnings does allow some analysts to issue superior investment 
advice.  
Further, our findings allow for conjectures concerning the informational efficiency of 
financial markets. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) observe that market prices cannot fully reflect 
all available information; otherwise, information gatherers like security analysts would not be 
rewarded for their costly activities. Considering the tremendous amount of resources that 
analysts plough into earnings analysis, our findings are comforting. We provide support for the 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) view of the markets in which a security analyst possessing superior 
expectations data is able to transform that information into generating better stock 
recommendations. 
Finally, our findings provide support for the fundamental analysis research in accounting 
and finance that envisages a predictive role of earnings for future stock price movements. We 
show that, in the unique setting of security analysts, where expectations of individual economic 
agents about both the future earnings (i.e., earnings forecasts) and the future stock price 
movements (investment recommendations) can simultaneously be observed, a better appreciation 
of future earnings is related with better assessment of future stock price movements.  
                                                 
11 Bradshaw (2002), for example, assumes that analysts use the residual income valuation model, and Cornell 
(2001) assumes that they use the discounted cash flow model. 
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Table I 
Sample Characteristics  
The sample consists of 2,322 industry-analyst observations from FY 1994–1999. The fiscal year convention 
is based on the period between FY1 earnings announcement dates. Analyst earnings forecasts and stock 
recommendations data are from I/B/E/S. Included analysts are those whom we are able to compute measures 
for both FY1 earnings forecasts accuracy and stock recommendation profitability for at least one of the fiscal 
years during our sample period.   
 
Panel A: Coverage 
 Number of times each is represented 
 
Total 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum 
Number of Analysts 1,858 1.2 1 4 1 
Number of Industries 30 77.4 57 288 8 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum St Dev 
MAFEik 0.014 -0.013 2.390 -0.868 0.232 
PROFik 0.010 -0.095 20.27 -1.00 0.751 
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Table II 
Persistence in Profitability and Accuracy 
Panel A reports the results of the following regression.  
iktiktiktiktikt DSIZEDEXPPMAFEPMAFE εαααα ++++= − 32110  
Panel B reports the results of the following regression.  
iktiktiktikt dummiesYeardummiesIndustryDSIZEPROFPROF εααα +++++= − 2110  
PMAFEikt, measures the average forecast accuracy of analyst i in industry k for year t. It is the average of all 
PMAFEijts for the analyst in industry k, where jtjtijtijt AFEAFEAFEPMAFE /)( −= . AFEijt is an aggregate 
measure of absolute forecast accuracy utilizing 4 salient forecast horizons across the whole fiscal year. The 
dependent variable for regression in Panel B is analyst i’s size-adjusted recommendation profitability, 
iktPROF . Size-adjustment is achieved by subtracting the CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq same decile returns 
from the recommendation’s raw returns. iktDEXP is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if analyst i is 
in the top quartile of analysts sorted on experience.  Similarly, iktDSIZE  returns a value of one if analyst i’s 
broker is in the top quartile according to the number of analysts that it employs. *, ** and *** indicate that 
the estimate is statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Persistence in Forecasting Ability 
Variables Coefficient Estimates t-statistic 
Intercept 0.052 *** 3.34 
MAFEikt-1 0.080 *** 3.67 
DEXPikt 0.004 0.31 
DSIZEikt -0.075 *** 5.54 
Adjusted -R2 2.64%  
Number of observations 2,936  
F-statistics 27.56  
(p-value) (<0.000)  
 
Panel B: Persistence in Recommendation Profitability 
Variables Coefficient Estimates t-statistic 
Intercept -0.164 *** 2.75 
PROFikt-1 0.075 ** 2.27 
DSIZEikt 0.033 1.48 
Adjusted -R2 11.37%  
Number of observations 2,936  
F-statistics 12.08  
(p-value) (<.000)  
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Table III 
Recommendation Returns (in percent) of the Best and Worst Forecasters 
 
The sample period ranges from FY1994 - FY1999. We first sort analysts into three groups according to the relative 
accuracy of their forecasts, PMAFEikt,, which is the average of analyst i’s PMAFEijts in industry k. 
jtjtijtijt AFEAFEAFEPMAFE )( −= , where AFEijt is the absolute forecast error of analyst i forecasting for firm j in 
year t. AFEijt is an aggregate measure of forecast accuracy utilizing 4 salient forecast horizons across the whole fiscal 
year.  We then report the average of size-adjusted returns ( miktPROF ) for the recommendations of all analysts falling in a 
group. The first five rows report the recommendation profitability of the five industries with the largest coverage. The 
last row reports all industries. If the best forecasters are better stock pickers, the difference between the returns of top and 
bottom groups, as reported in the last column, will be positive.  
Analysts Sorted on Forecasting Ability 
 
 
(SIC) Industry  # of Analysts 
Top Third Middle Third Bottom Third Top - Bottom 
      
(73) Business Services 288 74.54 18.90 34.36 40.19 
(28) Chemicals and Allied 191 2.97 -4.58 -3.83 6.80 
(36) Electrical 186 34.95 36.73 23.30 11.65 
(13) Oil & Gas Extraction 175 -10.26 -9.06 -23.65 13.39 
(67) Holding & Other Investment Offices 168 -10.25 -7.17 -11.61 1.36 
      
All Industries 
(t-statistic) 
2,322 
 
7.72 % 
 
–1.68 % 
 
-3.04 % 
 
10.76 % 
(2.69 ) 
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Table IV 
Recommendation Profitability Regressed Against Forecast Accuracy 
The coefficient estimates for three regressions are presented. The model estimated from the main (1994-99) 
and two sub-samples (1994-96 and 1997-99) is the following: 
ikikikik IndustryDSIZEPMAFEPROF εααα ++++= dummies 210  
The dependent variable for all regressions is analyst i’s relative size-adjusted recommendation profitability, 
iktPROF . Size-adjustment is achieved by subtracting the CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq same-size-decile 
returns from the recommendation’s raw returns., where the average raw profitability is calculated by tracking 
analyst i’s recommendations for firms he rates in industry k. Forecast accuracy is measured by PMAFEik, the 
average of analyst i’s PMAFEijts in industry k. jtjtijtijt AFEAFEAFEPMAFE /)( −= , where AFEijt is an 
aggregate measure of absolute forecast accuracy utilizing 4 salient forecast horizons across the whole fiscal 
year. iktDSIZE  returns a value of one if analyst i’s broker is in the top quartile for the number of analysts that 
it employs. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. *,**, and *** indicate 
that the estimates are different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
Coefficient Estimates Main Sample (1994-99) 
Sub-Sample 1 
(1994-96) 
Sub-Sample 2 
(1997-99) 
Intercept -0.187 *** -0.142 *** -0.234 *** 
 (5.07) (3.81) (4.83) 
PMAFEikt –0.158 *** -0.069 ** -0.165 ** 
 (2.88) (2.05) (2.43) 
DSIZEikt 0.050 * 0.028 0.049 
 (1.73) (1.62) (1.25) 
# of Observations 2,322 1,203 1,780 
Adjusted R2 7.30% 2.87% 9.30% 
F-statistics 6.90 2.32 7.08 
(p-value) (< 0.000) (< 0.000) (< 0.000) 
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Table V 
Recommendation Profitability Regressed Against Forecast Accuracy – Robustness Checks 
The model estimated from the main (1994-99) and two sub-samples (1994-96 and 1997-99) is the following: 
ikikikik IndustryDSIZEPMAFEPROF εααα ++++= dummies 210  
The dependent variable in Panel A is analyst i’s market-adjusted recommendation profitability, iktPROF . 
Market-adjustment is achieved by subtracting the CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq value-weighted market index 
returns from the recommendation’s raw returns. FY1 Forecast accuracy is measured by PMAFEik, the 
average of analyst i’s PMAFEijts in industry k. jtjtijtijt AFEAFEAFEPMAFE /)( −= , where AFEijt is an 
aggregate measure of absolute forecast accuracy. iktDSIZE  returns a value of one if analyst i’s broker is in 
the top quartile for the number of analysts that it employs. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below 
the coefficient estimates. *,** and *** indicate that the estimates are different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels of significance, respectively. The dependent variable in Panel B is size-adjusted recommendation 
profitability, where we start tracking the recommendation from day 0 (that is, the day the recommendation 
appears in the IBES database), instead of day -1 as in the previous analyses.  
Panel A: Using Market-Adjusted Recommendation returns 
Coefficient Estimates Main Sample (1994-99) 
Sub-Sample 1 
(1994-96) 
Sub-Sample 2 
(1997-99) 
Intercept -0.183 *** -0.156 *** -0.219 *** 
 (5.02) (4.24) (4.51) 
PMAFEikt –0.161 *** -0.076 ** -0.170 ** 
 (2.85) (2.35) (2.45) 
DSIZEikt 0.050  0.032 * 0.042 
 (1.54) (1.84) (1.05) 
# of Observations 2,322 1,203 1,780 
Adjusted R2 7.43% 2.63% 9.43% 
F-statistics 7.01 2.20 7.18 
(p-value) (< 0.000) (< 0.000) (< 0.000) 
 
Panel B: Using Issue Date as the First Date of Recommendation 
Coefficient Estimates Main Sample (1994-99) 
Sub-Sample 1 
(1994-96) 
Sub-Sample 2 
(1997-99) 
Intercept -0.200 *** -0.151 *** -0.248 *** 
 (5.70) (3.95) (5.42) 
PMAFEikt –0.134 ** -0.062 * -0.138 ** 
 (2.52) (1.85) (2.10) 
DSIZEikt 0.032 0.019 0.026 
 (1.15) (1.15) (0.69) 
# of Observations 2,322 1,203 1,780 
Adjusted R2 7.21% 2.58% 9.35% 
F-statistics 6.82 2.18 7.12 
(p-value) (< 0.000) (< 0.000) (< 0.000) 
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Figure 1. Four Horizons for Measuring Yearly Forecast Accuracy 
The timeline illustrates the four forecast horizons chosen for computing an aggregate measure to represent an analyst i’s FY1 forecast accuracy for an entire 
fiscal year t. Earnings announcement dates, whether for prior-year earnings or interim quarterly earnings, are denoted by a fine tick mark. Coarse tick marks 
denote financial year- or quarter-ends. The window periods specified for the first three horizons are 30-day in length for the purpose of mitigating forecast 
recency effects. Within the window period, the latest forecast outstanding is selected (i.e., nearest to the end of the window). Horizon four is the final unrevised 
forecast issued just before year t’s FY earnings announcement date. 
 
Year t  Year t+1 
Previous quarter’s interim earnings 
announcement dates.  
Horizon 1 
(one–year 
ahead)  
Year t’s earnings 
announcement date.  
Year t–1’s earnings 
announcement date.   
Q2 Q3 Q4 
Horizon 2 
(3–quarters 
ahead)  
Horizon 3 
(2–quarters 
ahead)  
Horizon 4 
(Final 
unrevised)  
